Kapitler om emotioner og social neurovidenskab i M.S.Gazzaniga (Ed.), The new
cognitive neurosciences (2000; kapitlerne 73-79) og The cognitive neurosciences
III (2004; kapitlerne 70-78).
|Mine personlige favoritkapitler er: 2000: Armony & LeDoux, Dolan, Pitman (AG)|
Tranel, D., Bechara, A., & Damasio, A.R. (2000). Decision making and the somatic marker
hypothesis. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The new cognitive neurosciences. (Second.Ed.).
Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. pp.1047-1061.
Abstract :How do we make decisions, simple or complicated? Which neural structures are important for decision making? Why do we sometimes make decisions that are favorable to us and sometimes decide against our best interests? Why do some individuals have a proclivity for bad decision making? These are just a few of the pressing questions regarding decision making - questions that are finally being asked within the compass of cognitive neuroscience. We have been investigating the neural basis of decision making by using a theoretical framework known as the somatic marker hypothesis. The framework proposes that decision making is dependent on signals from bioregulatory responses - those responses that are aimed at maintaining homeostasis and ensuring survival. The highest level of such responses includes emotions and feelings. We have studied both normal individuals and neurological patients whose decision making is profoundly impaired follwing damage to various sectors of the central nervous system (including the ventromedial prefrontal region, the right somatosensory and insular cortices, and the amygdala) and to the peripheral nervous ssytem. Neuropsychological and psychophysiological experiments in these patients have yielded intriguing new insights into the neural architectures required for decision making. A surprising conclusion from our work is that too little emotion has profoundly deleterious effects on decision making; in fact, too little emotion may be just as bad for decision making as excessive emotion has long been recognized to be. Our work indicates that individuals utilize bioregulatory responses, including emotions and feelings, to guide decision making in several important ways, both consciously and nonconsciously
Armony, J.L., & LeDoux, J.E. (2000). How danger is encoded: Toward a systems, cellular, and
computational understanding of cognitive-emotional interactions in fear. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.),
The new cognitive neurosciences. (Second.Ed.). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. pp.1067-1079.
Abstract :The neurobiology of cognitive-emotional interactions can be better understood by studying the neural mechanisms of well-defined and experimentally tractable aspects of particular emotions and by exploring their relationship with specific cognitive processes. In this chapter we focus on fear, because the neural bases of this emotion have been worked out better than any other. Specifically, we describe recent findings on behavioral and physiological aspects of fear conditioning. This issue is approached from both a systems and a cellular point of view, combining empirical studies with computational modeling. The interactions of the fear network with some of the neural systems associated with perception, attention, declarative memory, and consciousness are discussed
McGaugh, J.L., Roozendaal, B., & Cahill, L. (2000). Modulation of memory storage by stress
hormones and the amygdaloid complex. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The new cognitive neurosciences.
(Second.Ed.). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. pp.1081-1098.
Abstract :It is well established that emotional arousal influences long-term explicit/declarative memory formation. The hypothesis guiding research reviewed in this chapter is that this influence is mediated by activation of the amygdala by adrenergic and glucocorticoid stress hormones and that amygdala activation regulates memory consolidation occurring in other brain regions. This hypothesis is strongly supported by evidence that lesions of the amygdala block adrenal hormone influences on memory storage as well as evidence that drugs affecting adrenergic and glucocorticoid receptors modulate memory storage when infused directly into the amygdala after training. The memory-modulatory influences involve beta-adrenergic activation in the basolateral nucleus of the amygdala. Other findings indicate that an intact amygdala is not required for expression of retention of memory influenced by amygdala activation. Findings of studies with human subjects confirm those of animal studies. Beta-adrenoceptor antagonists and lesions of the amygdala block the enhancing effects of emotional arousal on memory. Furthermore, long-term retention of emotional material is highly correlated with PET activation of the amygdala during learning. Such findings provide strong support for the hypothesis that the basolateral amygdala is part of a system that regulates the strength of explicit/declarative memories in relation to their emotional significance
Ono, T., & Nishijo, H. (2000). Neurophysiological basis of emotion in primates: Regional responses
in the monkey amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The new cognitive
neurosciences. (Second.Ed.). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. pp.1099-1114.
Abstract :Both the amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex, which are the main components of the rhinencephalon, have been implicated in emotion. Neuronal responses in the amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex of the monkey to stimuli that were considered to be biologially significant were studied in behavioral tasks that involved the discrimination of different rewarding and aversive stimuli. Neurons in the amygdala displayed modulation of responses to objects in various situations including satiation and reversal, and in a specific context in which food delivery was expected. This finding suggests that the amygdala is involved in ongoing evaluation of sensory stimuli in a context-relevant manner. However, our results suggest that the anterior cingulate cortex integrates inputs from other emotion-related regions and from the cerebral cortex, and sends the information to motor executive centers to behave appropriately in a variety of specific motivational or emotional behavioral contexts. The present results could provide neuronal bases for the involvement of these emotion-related areas in human emotional and motivated behaviors
Dolan, R.J. (2000). Emotional processing in the human brain revealed through functional
neuroimaging. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The new cognitive neurosciences. (Second.Ed.).
Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. pp.1115-1131.
Abstract :The mechanisms by which sensory events that represent fear are processed in the human brain provides a general model for understanding emotional function. This chapter presents functional neuroimaging data from studies of fear processing and relates these to a neurobiological model of emotional processing. A critical role for the amygdala in processing sensory stimuli that signal fear is highlighted. The time course of an amygdala response to behaviorally relevant sensory inputs shows rapid habituation. When a previously neutral stimulus acquires an ability to elicit fear, this acquisition is expressed in plasticity changes in related sensory processing regions. This adaptive learning also involves context-specific changes in connectivity between sensory processing regions and regions such as the amygdala that mediate value. Using masking procedures, which disrupt conscious awareness of a target occurrence, priviledged access to the amygdala for sensory stimuli that signal fear can be demonstrated
Pitman, R.K., Shalev, A.Y., & Orr, S.P. (2000). Posttraumatic stress disorder: Emotion,
conditioning, and memory. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The new cognitive neurosciences.
(Second.Ed.). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. pp.1133-1147.
Abstract :Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) provides illustrations of human mechanisms of memory that can inform cognitive neuroscience. Because the etiologic event can be clearly identified, the role of Pavlovian conditioning is clearer in PTSD than in other mental disorders. Laboratory studies have confirmed the presence of peripheral physiologic reactivity upon exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event in PTSD. Functional neuroimaging studies implicate the anterior paralimbic system, including the amygdala, as a key brain area in the formation and elaboration of posttraumatic conditioned fear responses. In contrast, structural neuroimaging and functional memory studies suggest posterior paralimbic (i.e., hippocampal) impairment in PTSD. Persons with PTSD appear to be more conditionable on a constitutional or acquired basis. They are also more reactive to non-conditioned, especially startling, stimuli. Facilitation of emotional memory by stress hormones (especially epinephrine) released at the time of the traumatic event is theoretically involved in the pathogenesis of PTSD
Davidson, R.J. (2000). The neuroscience of affective style. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The new
cognitive neurosciences. (Second.Ed.). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. pp.1149-1159.
Abstract :Among the most striking features of human emotion is the pronounced variability across individuals in the quality and intensity of emotional reactions to the same elicitor. This chapter introduces a framework for the objective neuroscientific study of such individual differences in affective style. The constituents of affective style are first reviewed and methods for their objective study described. The circuitry underlying two major forms of emotion and motivation is then presented. The foundations of this analysis are derived from the animal literature, and such observvations are complemented by recent human neuroimaging studies. Emphasis is placed on the prefrontal cortex, the amygdala, and the ventral striatum in the generation of certain forms of positive and negative affect. Next, individual differences in aspects of this circuitry are considered. Here the emphasis is on individual differences in activation asymmetry in regions of the prefrontal cortex that appear to play a fundamental role in approach and withdrawal motivational disposition. Data are reviewed that indicate that individual differences in baseline measures of prefrontal activation are stable over time and predict both psychological and biological measures that have been linked to affective style. Finally, the implications of these data for conceptualizing the affective dysfunction in certain forms of psychopathology are considered
|Mine personlige favoritkapitler er: 2004: Phelps, Adolphs, Macrae (AG)|
Cacioppo, J.T., & Berntson, G.G. (2004). Social neuroscience. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The
cognitive neurosciences III. (Third.Ed.). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. pp.977-985.
Abstract :The past decade has seen the emergence of the interdisciplinary field of social neuroscience, which involves collaborations between cognitive scientists, social psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists, geneticists, biologists, neurologists, endocrinologists, and many others in related disciplines. Social neuroscience employs multiple methods of investigation with humans and other animals to address questions concerning interactions between mind, brain, and the social world
Schafe, G.E., & LeDoux, J.E. (2004). The neural basis of fear. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The
cognitive neurosciences III. (Third.Ed.). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. pp.987-1003.
Abstract :The fear memory system of the brain has received extensive experimental attention. In this chapter we first review what is known about simple fear conditioning at the behavioral, neural systems, and cellular levels. We then discuss certain higher-level processes in the fear memory system, including contextual fear conditioning, reconsolidation of fear, fear extinction, instrumental fear learning, and declarative memory modulation by emotionally relevant stimuli
Phelps, E.A. (2004). The human amygdala and awareness: Interactions between emotion and
cognition. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The cognitive neurosciences III. (Third.Ed.). Cambridge,MA:
MIT Press. pp.1005-1015.
Abstract :Traditional approaches to the study of human cognition considered emotion as a distinct process that could be studied independently. Initial investigations of the neuroscience of emotion supported this distinction by identifying brain structures, such as the amygdala, that appeared to be specialized for emotion. However, recent studies indicate that the amygdala interacts extensively with brain systems linked to cognition and awareness, suggesting a means for the interaction of emotion and cognition. Cognition and awareness can influence the amygdala through the verbal communication of emotion information or the cognitive control of emotional responses. The amygdala can influence cognition and awareness by altering the retention of memory with arousal and facilitating attention and perception. Evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that in order to understand the neural systems of cognition, a consideration of its interaction with emotion is necessary
Adolphs, R. (2004). Processing of emotional and social information by the human amygdala. In M.S.
Gazzaniga (Ed.), The cognitive neurosciences III. (Third.Ed.). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press.
Abstract :Studies in animals have implicated the amygdala in social and emotional information processing. Within the past decade, the role of this structure has also been investigated in humans, using a variety of techniques. Perhaps best explored is its function in social judgments about facial expressions, the focus of this review. Lesion studies, electrophysiology, and functional imaging have all been brought to bear on this topic, and these approaches have begun to sketch the processes whereby the amygdala links perceptual representations of emotional sensory stimuli with the elicitation of behavioral and cognitive responses. These responses, in turn, both guide social behavior and generate social knowledge. The chapter closes with a preview of future directions that this line of research suggests
Sapolsky, R.M. (2004). Stress and cognition. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The cognitive neurosciences III. (Third.Ed.). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. pp.1031-1042.
Breiter, H.C., & Gasic, G.P. (2004). A general circuitry processing reward/aversion information and
its implications for neuropsychiatric illness. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The cognitive neurosciences
III. (Third.Ed.). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. pp.1043-1065.
Abstract :Neuroimaging experiments in humans have provided strong evidence for a generalized circuitry that processes reward/aversion information. Composed of an extended set of subcortical grey matter regions and the surrounding paralimbic cortical girdle, these neural systems form the core of an information backbone (iBM) for motivated behavior. Components of this iBM appear to be affected in several neuropsychiatric illnesses. Circuitry-based quantitative measures of these IBM components, as heritable and state indices, may provide better etiologic insights than the diagnostic categories based on statistical clusters of behaviors and symptoms used in current psychiatric diagnosis. Recent studies have alluded to parallels between the events at the molecular and brain circuitry levels during presentation of motivationally salient stimuli. This chapter will explore how integrative systems biology approaches can bridge the distributed neural circuits responsible for the processing of reward/aversion function and the networks of genes responsible for the development and maintenance of these neural circuits. These combined genetics and integrative neuroscience approaches have the potential to redefine our conceptualization of neuropsychiatric illnesses with the implementation of objective quantitative measures
Macrae, C.N., Heatherton, T.F., & Kelley, W.M. (2004). A self less ordinary: The medial prefrontal
cortex and you. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The cognitive neurosciences III. (Third.Ed.).
Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. pp.1067-1075.
Abstract :Questions of self have perplexed thinkers for centuries. What is the nature of self-knowledge? How does one recognize oneself? Is self-referential processing supported by distinct neural operations? Reflecting contemporary interest in core aspects of social-cognitive functioning, discussion in this chapter centers on the issue of what it might mean to be a social agent in possession of a self. In pursuit of this objective, consideration is given to the role of medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) in self-referential processing and in mentalizing (i.e., theory of mind), cognitive operations that are fundamental components of human social cognition
Klein, S.B. (2004). The cognitive neuroscience of knowing one's self. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The
cognitive neurosciences III. (Third.Ed.). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. pp.1077-1089.
Abstract :The unified self of everyday experience may actually be composed of several functionally and neurally isolable components. These include episodic memories of one's own life, representations of one's own personality traits, facts about one's personal history (semantic personal knowledge), the experience of personal agency and continuity through time, and the ability to reflect on one's own thoughts and experiences (Klein, 2001). One component of the self - knowledge of one's own personality traits - is surprisingly resilient in the face of brain damage and developmental disorders. Personality knowledge can be preserved and even updated without any retrievable episodic memory. More strikingly, a pattern of category-specific dissociations within semantic memory suggests that the human cognitive architecture may include a subsystem that is functionally specialized for the acquisition, storage, and retrieval of trait self-knowledge. The ability to retrieve accurate information about one's own personality traits can be preserved despite damage to the systems that retrieve information from other content-based categories of semantic knowledge, including knowledge of other people's personality traits, knowledge of one's own personal history, knowledge of cultural history, and knowledge of facts about animals, foods, and objects. Neuropsychological case studies reveal dissociations not only of storage and retrieval but also of acquisition; personality knowledge may be acquired via learning mechanisms that are functionally distinct from those that cause the acquisition of knowledge about other domains. Taken together, the cognitive and neuropsychological evidence suggests that personality self-knowledge is acquired through domain-specific learning mechanisms, stored in proprietary databases, and retrieved via functionally specialized search engines
Beer, J., S., Shimamura, A.P., & Knight, R.T. (2004). Frontal lobe contributions to executive
control of cognitive and social behavior. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The cognitive neurosciences III.
(Third.Ed.). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. pp.1091-1104.
Abstract :This chapter examines the lateral and medial/orbitofrontal portions of the prefrontal lobes and their distinctive roles in controlling cognitive and social behavior. Evidence from neuropsychological, electrophysiological, and functional neuroimaging research suggests that lateral areas of the frontal lobes are involved in processes that permit the adaptive control of cognition, whereas orbitofrontal and medial prefrontal areas are involved in processes underlying the regulation of social behavior. Future research employing a host of cognitive neuroscience techniques will be critical for understanding how the lateral and orbitofrontal cortices interact to produce adaptive social behavior